Authors, editors, and editorial referees sometimes perform their roles inappropriately. When this happens, it is incumbent upon members of the scientific community to call attention to such collective misfeasance. The recently published article by Riedel (1970) provides us with such an occasion.
Two forms of error appear in Riedel's report of his study of the personal constructs of "psychotic patients." The first form of error is common to many researchers and textbook writers who fail to recognize the fact of paradigm decay in the study of schizophrenia. The second form of error arises from the author's restricted view of Kelly's (1955) conception of personal constructs.
Because theory articulation is notably absent in the published outcomes of schizophrenia research, the scientific community is eager to welcome any effort that purports to articulate schizophrenia with a standard reference theory, in this case Kelly's personal construct theory. The interconnections of personal construct theory and a body of research into perception and cognition has been extensively documented (Bannister, 1970; Mancuso, 1970) . More specifically, Bannister (1960 Bannister ( , 1962 Bannister & Salmon, 1966) has contributed extensively to the study of the personal construct systems of persons who carry the schizophrenia label (not noted in Riedel's report).
Riedel's report disappointingly repeats the errors of the last two decades of research into schizophrenia. The logical, empirical, or hypothetical connections between the theory and the experimental variables included in the imprecise hypothesis are unstated. The instruments used in Riedel's investigation are like instruments used in most schizophrenia research in that they are esoteric, unstandardized, and hardly capable of producing replicable results. Furthermore, demographic data on 5s (age, general conceptual developmental levels, and socioeconomic variables) are unreported. This oversight allows a reader the ultimate option of speculating that Riedel's results, like those of most research, derive from disguised variables; that is, variables other than the independent variable reportedly under study, schizophrenia-nonschizophrenia. Readers are assured that "the two groups did not differ in major population characteristics, except for marital status and number of years married [Riedel, 1970, p. 170] ." Following the example of previous investigators, Riedel classified persons on the basis of a diagnosis of "schizophrenia" made at the time of admission (in some cases 20 yr. previously), and no information is provided on the behavioral data from which the diagnosis emerged. This state of affairs does not restrain Riedel from offering "psychosis" as a meaningful independent variable.
The instruments yield readily quantified measures, such as "size of circles," "distance between circle pairs," etc. Yet the report 148 omits means and standard deviations of the samples' scores. Perhaps intending to save journal space, Riedel does not report the potentially embarrassing overlap between the scores of the "normals" and the scores of the "psychotics." As a rule, most schizophrenics' scores on experimental tasks are not quantitatively different from the scores derived from most control Ss.
Length of hospitalization is noted as a variable, but no consideration is given to the effects of "hospitalization" upon the results of the study, Riedel predicted that "psychotic" patients, in contrast to nonpsychiatric medical patients, would "less often show stable use of self-circle size [p. 175] ." What is the theoretical origin of this hypothesis? Riedel reported that in a pretest exploration of his instrument there was a "suggestion" that stable use of the samesized self-circles portrays "a continuing sense of sameness in different role relations [p. 175] ." Even a mildly critical reader would be cautious about basing this rather profound conclusion on what appears to be quite casual observation. One might generously grant, nevertheless, that a person's sense of his role relations does influence his choice of the size of a circle to represent his "self." In accepting this assumption, however, a reader requires a specification of the leaps through theory which lead to the prediction. Riedel simply ignored his obligation to specify the psychological principles which allow him to deduce the proposition: psychotics are deficient in the stability of their "continuing sense of sameness [p. 175] .
In offering this kind of proposition, Riedel inadvertently disclosed his docile dependence on a research strategy that pervades current schizophrenia research. The normal science of schizophrenia has illicitly shifted from the mechanistic paradigm, of which the illness model is an appropriate expression, to the employment of a formist paradigm. That is, the formal properties of that person bearing the diagnostic label schizophrenia become an explanation of his unacceptable or perplexing behavior. In practice, clinical descriptions and research conclusions implicitly assume that schizophrenics have a form which is deficient, hence "bad," "evil," "no good." From this moral premise, an investigator may make some logical jumps, paralleling Riedel: Less stability in the use of self-circle size is bad (less is somehow equated with bad); immaturity is not as good as maturity, hence bad. Schizophrenics (being bad by nature) will therefore show less stability in the use of self-circle size! Schizophrenics simply have the formal identity of chronic psychological deficiency, that is, badness. Thus, formism makes it unnecessary to justify the assumptions underlying the experimental hypotheses.
These criticisms are not intended to single out Riedel's work for special opprobrium. The shortcomings of his doctoral dissertation reflect the ambience in which the behavioral sciences conduct schizophrenia research. Like so many others, Riedel is an innocent victim of a paradigm-in-crisis (Kuhn, 1962 ).
Riedel's use of the basic concepts of personal construct theory require clarification. To generate hypotheses regarding personal constructs, there must be some agreement about the definition of constructs, "A construct is a way in which some things are construed as being alike and yet different from others [Kelly, 1955, Vol. 1, p. 105] ." Admittedly, the term allows ambiguity in interpretation. Nevertheless, recent use of the concept shows that a theorist profits from stressing the dimensional nature of the cognitive structures known as constructs. The behaving person is then seen to operate with a finite number of bipolar dimensions, which are arranged in hyperspace. In Kelly's system these cognitive structures carry the label construct. Through this approach, an investigator of personal constructs can relate his work to the network of theory which treats the constuing process as a judgment process (Bieri, Atkins, Briar, Leaman, Miller, & Tripodi, 1966; Helson, 1967; Scott, 1969; Mancuso, 1970 ).
Riedel's 5s were required to draw circles (on a 3 X 3 "Tic-tac-toe" grid) to represent persons such as self, mother, priest, doctor, etc. Riedel describes these persons (and the circles by which they are represented) as role constructs. A variety of measurements, for example, the placement of the circles, their size, the stability (over trials) of the size of the representational circle, etc., provide Riedel with the quantifiable aspects of his study. These quantifications also provide interpretative confusion.
Circles are not personal constructs. Investigators infer constructs. When an 5 draws a circle to represent his self, can an investigator infer the dimensions of the self-role construct (the internal cognitive organization) from observing the spatial dimensions of the circle? A large self-circle implies a large self-construct! Can we infer that the dimensions a person uses in the judgment of spatial relationships are the dimensions he uses to judge his self-role?
Riedel's reading of the work of Kuethe (1962) might have encouraged him to adopt spatial metaphors to describe person judgment processes. Kuethe reported, however, that 5s respond differently to geometric figures than they do to cutouts which are more clearly denned as social stimuli. Kuethe did not suggest that a behavior analyst can infer "selfesteem," "freedom of movement," etc., from a person's mode of spatially aligning geometric figures.
Riedel's investigation, then, only adds to the accumulation of theoretically empty investigations of schizophrenia. Readers expect that his report should meet the logical requirement that investigations into schizophrenia shall articulate to a useful behavior theory (Bannister, 1968) . Aside from failing to use the most current elaborations of Kelly's basic conceptions, Riedel violates the very spirit of personal construct theory. When, for example, he fails to adhere to Kelly's salient distinction between the construct and the thing construed, Riedel drew inappropriate inferences through treating S's representational productions as exact analogues of the S's inferred cognitive organizations.
Though unfortunate, Riedel's theoretical misjudgment only highlights the faults of a study which takes its place among hundreds of noninforming studies of schizophrenia. One can convincingly extend these brief criticisms to show how Riedel, like other students of schizophrenia, violates the logical requirements of studying behavior as if it were a disease. No one, for example, would attempt to study the disease tuberculosis the way Riedel (and others) study schizophrenia. Riedel's formulations reflect the moribund status of the disease paradigm. In Riedel's study, as in the major portion of current research into schizophrenia, a switch in paradigms has occurred. Because of the failure of the paradigm of man as machine when applied to deviant conduct, behavior scientists have unwittingly adopted the platonic paradigm of man as form. Schizophrenia now functions as a form, rather than a disease process such as tuberculosis or measles. Riedel's study stands as a succinct example of one of the subtle effects of the failure of the disease model in understanding human conduct.
